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tion must be presently vested, legally enforceable 8 and wholly de-
pendent upon the recovery of the party. For example, an attorney
whose fee is contingent upon recovery by his client is incompetent to
testify as to transactions with a deceased person which are against the
interest of the other party to the action,' 9 whereas if he has a right to a
reasonable fee even though the other party may prevail, such testimony
is admissible20 In an action by the best friend of a minor son against
the executor of his deceased father's estate to enforce a contract
whereby the father agreed to leave his entire estate to the son, the
mother of the child was held to be competent to testify as to the trans-
actions with the deceased concerning the contract. The court held
that the parent must ordinarily provide support for a minor child if
the parent is able to do so and thus the mother of the child would not
legally benefit from the judgment since it would not relieve her of that
duty.21 An undertaker, though he may be looking to the proceeds of a
funeral benefit policy for compensation, may testify as to acts of the
decedent, as his right to compensation is not dependent upon recovery
but is absolute even in its absence.22
In conclusion, the tests to be applied in determining whether the
degree of interest of a witness is such as will render that testimony in-
competent under section 606(2) of the Civil Code of Practice are: (1)
The interest must be a pecuniary one (2) It must be present and
vested (8) It must be one which will be affected by the direct legal
operation of the judgment.
NoiuA D. Bos=n
FEDERAL TAXATION: REGULATION THROUGH TAXATION-
BOOKIE TAX
The recent enactment by Congress of the occupational tax on
persons engaged in wagering' suggests the interesting question of
whether the tax is a constitutional exercise of the taxing power con-
ferred on Congress by Art. I, sec. 8 of the Constitution. The act im-
"A witness who deceased had requested "be taken care of" out of a gift to
a party to the action was held competent to testify as to acts of deceased be-
cause the witness never had an enforceable claim against the party and it would
not become valid by legal operation of the judgment. Trevathan's Ex'r v. Dee's
Ex'rs, 221 Ky. 396, 298 S.W. 975 (1927).
" Smick's Adm'r v. Beswicek's Adm'r, 113 Ky. 439, 68 S.W. 439 (1902).
"Haydon v. Easter, 15 Ky. Law Rep. 597, 24 S.W. 626 (1894).
"Arnold v. Arnold's Ex'r, 237 S.W. 2d 58 (Ky. 1951).
'Corbin Council No. 80, Junior Order, United American Mechanics v.
Partin, 307 Ky. 827, 212 S.W. 2d 212 (1948).
' 26 U.S.C.A., 3285-3291 (1951).
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poses a 10%. excise tax on wagers, as there defined, and an occupational
stamp tax of $50 a year on persons liable for the excise tax. It further
requires such persons to register their names, residences, and places of
business, and the names and residences of persons who receive wagers
for them or for whom they receive wagers. Violation exposes the
offender to criminal penalties. Because of the provisions for registra-
tion and disclosure of information, the contention has been made that
Congress has attempted to use its taxing power to regulate in a field
belonging to the states under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion.
The question of the validity of the statute has been presented to the
federal district courts in four cases and has been held unconstitutional
by only one court. The question was raised for the first time in Combs
v. Snyder,2 and the District Court for the District of Columbia held
the statute valid without discussion of the constitutional issues tendered
by the defendant. The second time the question arose was in the Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in the case of
United States v. Kahriger,3 where the statute was held to be uncon-
stitutional as an attempted ursurpation of the police powers of the
states under the guise of a revenue measure. However, the statute
was again held to be constitutional in two subsequent cases in which
its validity was questioned. In United States v. Nadler,4 the District
Court for the Northern District of California rejected defendant's con-
tentions that the tax violated the Tenth Amendment and stated that
the registration requirements of the act did not make the statute a
regulation since other statutes had been upheld which required the
same general kind of information. In United States v. Smith,5 the
statute was upheld in the Southern District of California, the court
specifically rejecting the decision reached in the Kahriger case( as er-
roneous.
It has long been settled that Congress may not use its taxing power
for the primary purpose of regulating a matter whose regulation lies
within the exclusive competence of the states.7 But the incidental
presence of an ulterior motive to regulate the matters involved does
not invalidate a statute if the primary purpose is to raise revenue.8 In
accordance with this view the Supreme Court has held valid a heavy
'101 F. Supp. 531 (D.C. 1951).
"105 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
'105 F. Supp. 918 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
106 F. Supp. 9 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
' 105 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
7 RoTrscHrAEx, A.mEmucm CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 175 (1939).
'RorrscELmA.m, op. cit. supra note 7, 175.
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tax on state bank notes which had the purpose of driving the latter out
of circulation, 9 a tariff to encourage industries in competition with
foreign producers, 10 a tax which discouraged the manufacture and sale
of oleomargarine," a license tax on dealers in firearms of a type used
mainly by gangsters,' 2 a tax on the manufacture and sale of certain
narcotic drugs, 13 and a heavy tax on transfers of marihuana.14 How-
ever, the measures in the first two cases were also supportable as
exercises of other powers conferred on Congress, respectively, the
power to regulate currency, and the power to regulate foreign com-
merce.
But there are cases in which the ulterior motive has been held by
the Court to so predominate over the revenue motive as to transform
that which purports to be a tax into a penalty for violating a regu-
latory statute which is beyond the power of Congress.' 5 As illustrative
of this principle, a tax on a departure from a detailed and specified
course of conduct in business, employment of children under a speci-
fied age beyond a certain number of hours per week, with an exemp-
tion to those who employed a child under a mistake as to the child's
age and without intention to evade the tax was held unconstitutional
in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.'6 In Hill v. Wallace,1 a tax on every
bushel of grain involved in a contract of sale for future delivery, but
with exemptions of sales by members of a Board of Trade designated
by the Secretary of Agriculture as a contract market, met the same
fate. A normal excise tax of $25 on retail dealers in malt liquors and a
special excise tax of $1000 in addition, solely because of his violation
of state law, was held unconstitutional in United States v. Constan-
tin-,I s and a processing tax coupled with provisions authorizing ap-
propriations for "coercive" contracts to restrict production was held
invalid as a scheme for the regulation of agricultural production in
United States v. Butler.'9
The line of distinction between these two groups of cases is
obscure, but it is submitted that on precedent the occupational tax
'Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U.S. 1869).
" Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
' McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
"Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332 (1928); Alston v. United States, 274
U.S. 289 (1927); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1918).
"I United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950), noted in 36 IowA LAw REV.
699 (1951).
RowrscmaEiER, op. cit. supra note 7, 178.
16259 U.S. 20 (1922).
'7259 U.S. 44 (1922).
18296 U.S. 287 (1935).
"297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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clearly lines up with the group of cases in which the taxes have been
held constitutional. The statute does not set up a detailed and com-
plete regulation of a subject and enforce it by a tax on departures
from the desired course of conduct. Rather, a straight tax is laid on
wagers and no effort is made to prescribe the conduct of the wagering
enterprise. Admittedly, registration provisions are included, but they
are justifiable as means necessary to the enforcement of the tax. In
United States v. Kahriger,20 the court admitted that the revenue and
taxing features of the legislation were valid, but struck down the
statute because of the registration provisions. However, as was pointed
out in United States v. Nadler,21 similar provisions have been upheld
in other statutes, and the information required here cannot be said to
be unnecessary or non-essential to effective collection of the tax.
Therefore, the registration provisions would seem to present no con-
stitutional difficulty. They must evidently be regarded as directed
toward the collection of the tax on wagers and the prevention of
evasion by persons subject to that tax. The legislative history of the
statute discloses that:
"The committee conceives of the occupational tax as an
integral part of any plan for the taxation of wagers and as essential
to the collection and enforcement of such a tax. Enforcement of a
tax on wagers frequently will necessitate the tracing of transactions
through complex business relationships, thus requiring the identifica-
tion of the various steps involved. For this reason, the bill provides
that a person who pays the occupational tax must, as part of his
registration, identify those persons who are engaged in receiving
wagers for or on his behalf, and, in addition, identify the persons
on whose behalf he is engaged in receiving wagers." 22
It has been repeatedly held that registration provisions are sup-
portable as in aid of a revenue purpose.23
It appears on the face of the occupational tax that it will likely
produce some revenue, and it cannot be said that-it would be merely
negligible. Indeed, it appears from the legislative history of the act
that Congress estimated a revenue of $400 million per year from the
two taxes. It was there said that:
"Commercialized gambling holds the unique position of
being a multi-billion-dollar, nation-wide business that has remained
comparatively free from taxation by either State of Federal Govern-
105 F. Supp; 322 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
105 F. Supp. 918 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
S2 U. S. Code Congressional Service, H. R. REP. No. 586, 82nd Cong., 1st
Sess. 1781, 1844 (1951).
'United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950); Sonzinsky v. United States,
300 U.S. 506 (1937); Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 832 (1928); United States
v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1918).
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ments. This relative immunity from taxation has persisted in spite
of the fact that wagering has many characteristics which make it
particularly suitable as a subject for taxation. Your committee is con-
vinced that the continuance of this immunity is inconsistent with
the present need for increased revenue, especially at a time when
many consumer items of a semi-necessity nature are being called upon
to bear new or additional tax burdens."'
But regardless of the revenue produced, the Supreme Court has
indicated that it will not second-guess Congress as to the revenue
potential which a tax contains. In Sonzinsky v. United States, the
Court said:
"Inquiry into the hidden motives which may move Con-
gress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond
the competency of courts .... They will not undertake, by collateral
inquiry as to the measure of the regulatory effect of a tax, to ascribe
to Congress an attempt, under the guise of taxation, to exercise an-
other power denied by the Federal Constitution. . . . Here the
annual tax of $200 is productive of some revenue. We are not free to
speculate as to the motives which moved Congress to impose it, or
as to the extent to which it may operate to restrict the activities
taxed." -"
In the recent case of United States v. Sanchez26 the Court con-
sidered the validity of the Marihuana Tax Act. By that law, a special
tax was imposed on "every person who imports, manufactures, pro-
duces, compounds, sells, deals in, or gives away marihuana." For
purposes of administration, such persons were required to register at
the time of payment of the tax with the Collector of their district. It
was then made unlawful for any person to transfer marihuana except
in pursuance of a written order of the transferee on a form issued
by the Secretary of the Treasury. At the time the transferee applied
for the order form, he was also required to pay a tax on such transfer
of $1 per ounce if he had registered and paid the special tax as pro-
vided above, or $100 per ounce if he had not. The transferor was
liable for the tax if the transfer was made without the order form and
without payment of the tax by the transferee. In an action for the
recovery of taxes under the Marihuana Tax Act, Mr. Justice Clark,
speaking for a unanimous court, held the statute to be constitutional
even though it could easily have been held that the tax was so high
as to be prohibitive or that revenue was only an incidental purpose of
the act. However, if the dictum of Mr. Justice Clark is taken literally,
'1 2 U.S. Code Congressional Service H. R. REP. No. 586, 82nd Cong. 1st
Sess. 1781, 1828 (1951).
'300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937).
840 U. S. 42 (1950).
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the principles of law heretofore thought applicable to these cases
will no longer be controlling. It was there said that:
"... a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates,
discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed ... The
principle applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously
negligible .... or the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary
... .Nor does a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches on
activities which Congress might not otherwise regulate."
This language would seem to indicate that future tax statutes will
be held constitutional regardless of their regulatory effect, even though
the revenue purpose is merely secondary, provided the statute is
labelled a tax. Although it is true that the actual decision of the
case was much narrower than the opinion indicates, it should at least
show that the present trend is to extend the use of the taxing power
as a regulatory device, and that the Supreme Court is not yet ready to
draw the line which must undoubtedly exist if the taxing power of
congress under the Federal Constitution is not to be used to destroy the
federal system.*
Joam K. LEOPARD
FAILURE TO MENTION AFTERBORN CHILDREN IN WILL
MADE WHILE WIFE IS PREGNANT AS SHOWING
INTENT TO DISINHERIT
Most civilized nations give a person the privilege of disposing of
his property by will. In Anglo-American countries this freedom of
testation is permitted with fewer restrictions than in civil law coun-
tries.' For example, in the continental countries, regardless of the
wishes of the testator, the children, spouse, and parents take forced
shares of which they usually cannot be deprived.2 But in England and
America, the survivors are not so protected and may generally be dis-
inherited by the decedent.3
There are statutes in the United States, however, designed to
prevent under some circumstances, unintentional disinheritance of
children not mentioned in a will. In six states statutes declare that
wills made during marriage are revoked by the birth of issue there-
-'Id. at 44.
Since this note was written the Bookie Tax has been upheld by the Supreme
Court of the United States in United States v. Karhfiger, 78 S. Ct. 510 (March 9,
1953).
5 ATmNSON, WiLs 95 (1987).
2 Id. at 8.
"Ibid.
